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THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT: 2002
DONALD L. BESCHLE

°

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment is a perennial source of litigation in federal
courts. It is unsurprising, then, that the last year produced several Seventh
Circuit opinions dealing with speech and religion issues. While none of
these cases could be said to break new ground, they illustrate some
interesting and recurring First Amendment contexts. During 2002, the
Seventh Circuit dealt with claims that government had improperly limited
access to both traditional and limited public forums, that a Chicago peddling
ordinance constituted a prior restraint on speech, that the Milwaukee Police
Department had improperly retaliated against officers for their exercise of
free speech rights, and that government had denied parties their right to free
exercise of religion in widely different ways.
I.

PUBLIC FORUMS AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF PRIVATE SPEECH

In Southworth v. Board of Regents,' the Seventh Circuit issued its
fourth decision in six years dealing with a First Amendment challenge to the
mandatory student activity fee system maintained by the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. 2 The lawsuit, originally filed in 1996, challenged that
part of the fee system that authorized allocation of funds by student
government to student organizations engaging in speech activity that the
plaintiffs found objectionable. 3 The challenge was based upon earlier
*Professor, John Marshall Law School; B.A. Fordham University; J.D. New York
University School of Law; LL.M. Temple University School of Law. Thanks to Shannon
Speese, JMLS '04, for research assistance with this article.
1. Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 307 F.3d 566 (7th
Cir. 2002).
2. The case was first dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in 1997. Southworth v. Grebe,
124 F.3d 205 (7th Cir. 1997). It came up on appeal a year later and was affirmed in part,
reversed in part and vacated in part, Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998),
and the petitioner's request for a Rehearing was denied. Southworth v. Grebe, 159 F.3d
1124 (7th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court then reversed the Seventh Circuit's earlier
opinion. Bd. Of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). On remand, the Seventh
Circuit remanded it to the district court. Southworth v. Grebe, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
15470 (7th Cir. 2000). It appeared before the Seventh Circuit for a fourth time, in which
the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Southworth v. Grebe, 307 F.3d 566 (7th
Cir. 2002).
3. The students claimed that "forcing them to fund other students' political and
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Supreme Court decisions holding that mandatory fees charged to members of
a union 4 or a unified state bar association5 could not be used to6 subsidize
speech on matters not germane to the purpose of the organization.
Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit, applying these
decisions, held that the fee system violated the First Amendment,7 but the
Supreme Court reversed.8 In the 2000 decision of Board of Regents v.
Southworth, the Supreme Court found that, in light of the remarkably broad
scope of matters that could be classified as germane to the purposes of a
university, rules appropriate for the regulation of speech activity by unions or
professional associations were "neither applicable nor workable in the
context of extracurricular student speech." 9
The Court did, however, hold that objecting students were entitled to
some degree of First Amendment protection. Specifically, the Court stated,
"[t]he proper measure, and the principal standard of protection for objecting
students ... is the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of
funding support." 1 The case was remanded for a determination of whether
the University's system satisfied this requirement."1
The concept of viewpoint neutrality, and the way in which it differs
from the more sweeping requirement of content neutrality, was developed by
the Supreme Court in cases posing challenges to the ways in which
government restricted access to public property by those seeking to engage
in expressive activity.12 When government regulates expressive activity on
private property, perhaps the most important requirement is that the

ideological speech violated their First Amendment rights," since a number of funded
student organizations "used a portion of the student activity fees to engage in political and
ideological activities." ld.at 569.
4. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
5. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. I (1990).

6. In Abood, the Court upheld the practice of mandatory service charges requiring
non-union members to contribute to the activities of the union representing them insofar as
the union was engaged in "collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment purposes." 431 U.S. at 232. But fees from non-members could not be
compelled for "ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining." Abood, 431 U.S.
at 236.
Similarly, in Keller, dues paid to the State Bar of California, "in which
membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law in [the] [s]tate," could
be used to "regulat[e] ...the legal profession and improv[e] the quality of legal services,"
but not to fund "activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of
activity." Id.
at 5, 13-14.
7. Southworth, 151 F.3d at 718.
8. Bd.of Regents, 529 U.S. at 235-36.
9. Id. at 230. "If it is difficult to define germane speech with ease or precision where
a union or bar association is the party, the standard becomes all the more unmanageable in
the public university setting, particularly where the State undertakes to stimulate the whole
universe of speech and ideas." Id.
at 232.
10. Id. at 233.
11. Id.at 236.
12. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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regulation be "content neutral," that is, imposed regardless of the content or
subject matter of the expression.' 3 But over the years, the Court has been
inconsistent in its approach to whether the same requirement applies where
government regulates access to public property. The earliest cases gave
government the same right that a private landowner would have, the right to
completely exclude expressive activity from its property.' 4 But, beginning in
the 1930s, the Court recognized that at least some public property had the
5
status of a "public forum,"'
and access to such property had to be regulated
6
way.
neutral
content
a
in
This led to the question of what property was to be regarded as a public
forum. Cases from the 1960s suggested, without clearly holding, that there
was an initial presumption that public property was available as a forum for
expression, and that it was up to the government to rebut the presumption by
demonstrating that allowing access would significantly interfere with the
government activity taking place on the property.17
But in recent decades, the Court's approach has shifted significantly.
Cases now make it clear that, with the exception of venues like streets and
'' 8
parks that have acquired the status of "traditional public forums,

13. "[T]he First Amendment, subject to only narrow and well-understood exceptions,
does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by
private individuals." Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994), "[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content." Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
14. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The Court upheld a Boston
ordinance prohibiting public speaking on public streets without a permit. Davis, 167 U.S.
at 48. In the lower court, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, "For the legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or a public park is no more an
infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house
to forbid it in his house." Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895).
15. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
16. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 428-31 (1993)
(holding an ordinance banning newsracks for distribution of primarily commercial
magazines, but not ordinary newspapers, to be content-based and unconstitutional); Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-29 (1988) (holding a District of Columbia ordinance
prohibiting display of signs critical of a foreign government within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy an unconstitutional, content-based restriction).
17. For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the Court invalidated a
school district regulation prohibiting students from wearing armbands in protest of the
Vietnam war. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). The Court found that the armbands had caused
no disruption in school activities. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14. It did not initially dwell on
whether the school should be classified as a public forum. Similarly, in Adderly v.
Florida, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld trespass convictions of protestors who
gathered on the driveway of a local jail. 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966). The majority stressed
that the protestors were interfering with jail operations. Adderly, 385 U.S. at 45. This
conclusion was questioned by the dissenters. Id. at 51 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public, and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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government has broad discretion to choose either to close or open its
property to those who desire access for expressive activity. 19 Furthermore,
the decision of whether to designate government property as a public forum
need not be an all-or-nothing choice. Government may choose to open a
forum to expression on a limited range of subjects, as long as the choice of
what to allow or exclude bears some rational relationship to the nature of the
property and its normal public purpose. 20
This, of course, gives government the ability to act in a contentsensitive way. Unlike government regulation of speech on private property
or in the traditional public forum, government may sometimes legitimately
exclude expression from the non-public forum based on its subject matter.
However, the Court has placed one significant restriction on the exercise of
this discretion. If a topic or an issue is permitted into a limited public forum,
government may not restrict speakers based upon their "viewpoint" or
position on that issue. 2
Thus, for example, while government might
legitimately decide that a public school auditorium may not be used by
outside groups to present positions on controversial social issues such as
abortion or affirmative action, it may not allow access only to those
advocating one side of such issues, and exclude their opponents.
Viewpoint neutrality, then, the requirement "that minority views are
treated with the same respect as are majority views ' ' 22 on any particular issue,
became the primary standard for assessing the validity of the University of
Wisconsin's mandatory student fee program.23 On remand, the plaintiffs did
not contend that the University had "engaged in specific acts of viewpoint
discrimination," but rather that the system that the University employs fails,
on its face, to assure viewpoint neutrality by granting student government
"unbridled discretion" in allocating funds to student organizations. 24
19. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983).
The Court points out that access to a traditional public forum must be regulated in a
content-neutral manner, or be subject to strict scrutiny, and that access to designated public
forums is governed by the same standard, but that with respect to "[p]ublic property which
is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication," the State may
"reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
20. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (stating, "access to a nonpublic forum can be
based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral").
21. Id.See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001).
The Court stated, "[w]hen the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not
required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech." Good News
Club, 533 U.S. at 106. Indeed, the State "may be justified 'in reserving [its forum] for
certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics."' Id.(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). However, the State's power to
restrict speech "is not without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech
on the basis of viewpoint ...and the restriction must be 'reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum."' Id.at 106-07 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
22. Bd.ofRegents, 529 U.S. at 235.
23. Id.
24. Southworth, 307 F.3d at 574.
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Citing a line of Supreme Court cases holding that a licensing system
that granted overly broad discretion to government bodies is
unconstitutional, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could attack the
program on its face, and did not need to point to any particular instance of
viewpoint discrimination. 25 Just as unbridled discretion could create an
unacceptable risk of content discrimination in these earlier cases, so it could
create an unacceptable risk of viewpoint discrimination as well.
However, in examining the criteria that the University had imposed
upon the expenditure of student government funds following the Supreme
Court's 2000 decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the University had
sufficiently limited the student government's discretion with respect to most
funding decisions.26 The criteria governing grants for events include sixteen
factors; the criteria for grants to cover operating expenses for student groups
include eleven factors.27 Most of these factors are entirely unrelated to the
expressive content of the event or organization.2 8 At least two of the factors
for evaluating grants do require some evaluation of content. In order to gain
the status of a Registered Student Organization, and become eligible for
grants, a group must establish that it provides an "identifiable educational
benefit and service to the students of the University. '29 And applicants for
event or program grants must establish "[t]hat the event does not duplicate
events/programs provided by other University departments or programs., 30
Plaintiffs argued that the University criteria were inadequate in at least
two respects. First, they contended that the content-neutral criteria could be
used in bad faith to create a pretext for engaging in viewpoint
discrimination. 3' Second, the requirements of providing an identifiable
educational service to the University and avoiding duplication could easily
be manipulated to do the same. 32 The court rejected these contentions,
noting that even the finest set of standards would fail if it were sufficient to
claim that they could be ignored or manipulated in bad faith, and also that
the University had established an acceptable appeals procedure available to
any organization claiming that its application had been improperly denied.33
But though the court rejected the claim that the standards conferred
unbridled discretion, it found fault with two of the criteria, on the grounds
that they created too great a risk of viewpoint discrimination.34 Interestingly
enough, the criteria found to be troubling did not make any explicit reference

25. Id.
26. Id. at 592. The exception was for the allocation of travel grants, for which the
University had not yet issued standards. Id.
27. Id. at 586-87.
28. Id. Requirements include, for example, that the organizers fill out an application
describing expenses, that they attend a committee hearing, that the funded event be open to
all students, and that it be held on or near campus. Id.
29. Southworth, 307 F.3d at 584.
30. Id. at 587.
31. ld.at 590.
32. Id.
33. Id at 588.
34. Id.
at 593-95.
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to content, unlike the "educational service" and non-duplication
requirements that were permitted to stand.35
One of the University's funding standards provided that the number of
years that a student organization had been in existence should be considered
in funding decisions. 36 The court found that this standard "cannot be said to
be unrelated to viewpoint." 37 In general, this "discriminates against less
traditional viewpoints." 38 More specifically, the Court found that this
standard would disadvantage "organizations espousing partisan political or
religious viewpoints," since those categories 39of organizations had been
excluded from University funding until recently.
In addition, the Court found fault with the standard that permitted the
student government to consider "the number of students benefiting from the
speech., 40 Although it refused to find this a facially invalid standard, since
"some variable expenses will legitimately depend on this factor, such as the
amount of money needed for refreshments,'
it cautioned that this standard
cannot be used to allow "improper consideration of the popularity of the
speech. 42 Viewpoint neutrality requires "that minority views are treated
with the same respect as majority views. 43
Southworth illustrates both the currently accepted standards for
analyzing government regulation of speech in a nonpublic forum, 44 and some
of the troubling aspects of those standards. The basic principle states that
government may be sensitive to content in permitting access to nonpublic
forums, provided that decisions to include or exclude categories of
expression are rationally related to maintaining the core functions of the
forum, and observe viewpoint neutrality. 45 Depending on the forum and the
expression at issue in a particular case, however, it is not always clear
whether a decision is viewpoint sensitive, content sensitive but viewpoint
neutral, or entirely content neutral.46 Is a municipal restriction on the volume
of music played at an outdoor public place content neutral? Is the volume
part of the content? 47 Is it perhaps viewpoint sensitive, on the theory that the

35. Id.
36. Southworth, 307 F.3d at 587.

37. Id. at 593-94.
38. Id. at 594. "[U]nder the current funding system, historically popular viewpoints are
at an advantage compared with newer viewpoints." Id.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 595.
42. Southworth, 307 F.3d at 595. Such consideration, the court noted, could give rise
to "an as-applied challenge" to the standards. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra notes 19-21 (outlining those standards).
45. Southworth, 307 F.3d at 595.
46. For example, in Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld a prohibition on protests within
100 feet of the entrance of an abortion clinic. 530 U.S. 703, 734-35 (2000). The Court
held that this was, on its face, content neutral. Hill, 530 U.S. at 734-35. Dissenting
justices disagreed, claiming that the regulation was "directed against the opponents of

abortion." Id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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messages conveyed by, say, heavy metal
are distinctly different from those
48
conveyed by a classical string quartet?
Southworth presents similar problems. While at least one standard,
which on its face was entirely unrelated to content, was found to
impermissibly create the danger of viewpoint discrimination, 49 two standards
for the recognition of student organizations that require obvious evaluation
of content were nevertheless approved as, at least on their face, viewpoint
neutral. 50
Despite occasional problems such as the classification of limitations on
the volume of music, content-sensitivity is usually recognizable with some
certainty.5' A somewhat more difficult problem, posed only in cases seeking
access to nonpublic forums, is whether the viewpoint neutral exclusion of
categories of speech from such forums is rationally related to the functioning
and purposes of those forums. 2 In Southworth, the requirement that student
organizations must demonstrate that their activity provide an "identifiable
educational service" to the University community 53 seems on its face entirely
reasonable, if not necessary, in performing this legitimate level of content
analysis. But in the context of the University, it presents interesting
problems when coupled with the requirement of viewpoint neutrality.
Similarly, the non-duplication requirement, on its face, seems merely to help
preserve a scarce resource for distribution over the widest range of subjects
and viewpoints, but it also presents some problems with respect to
viewpoint.
The basic premise of viewpoint neutrality in First Amendment
jurisprudence seems roughly equivalent to the basic principle of modem
objective joumalism.

54

There are two sides to every issue, and both deserve

not only to be heard, but to receive equal access in disseminating their
message. But even the briefest reflection on issues in the real world reveals

48. "[Q]uestions of tone and mix cannot be separated from musical expression as a
whole... [b]ecause judgments that sounds are too loud, noiselike, or discordant can mask
disapproval of the music itself." Ward, 491 U.S. at 810 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. The standard that permitted consideration of "the number of students benefiting
from the speech" required not an analysis of the substance of the message, but a
calculation the number of listeners; still, the Court found it to create problems with
viewpoint neutrality. Southworth, 307 F.3d at 594-95.
50. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 12-16 and cases cited therein.
52. For example, in Perry, the Court held that a school policy permitting the
recognized teachers' union access to the interschool mail system and teachers' mailboxes,
while excluding a rival union, was rationally related to the function of the school system,
specifically in efficient communication between teachers and their chosen bargaining
representatives. Perry, 460 U.S. at 54-55. Four dissenters, however, saw the exclusion of
unions challenging the currently recognized union as viewpoint discrimination, rather than
permissible content limitation in a nonpublic forum. Id. at 56-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Southworth, 307 F.3d at 590.
54. See generally RON F. SMITH, GROPING FOR ETHICS INJOURNALISM 35-54 (4th ed.

1999). Smith discusses the problems inherent in a commitment to "objectivity," and also
points out that the notion that media are supposed to be unbiased was not always prevalent
in American journalism, nor is it entirely accepted outside of North America. Id.
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that the "two sides" model is far from a complete picture. First, we can
easily see that with respect to many, if not most, issues of public policy, law,
morality and religion, there are not merely two competing sides; rather, there
are many viewpoints falling somewhere along a spectrum between extremes.
At the same time, we might also recognize that, however heretical it may
seem in terms of standard First Amendment theory, there are certain issues
on which there simply is no legitimate "other side."
The first problem, that of the common existence of far more than two
"sides" to an issue, can be easily dealt with in a world where there is no
scarcity of resources to provide a platform for advocates. As long as there is
more time available in Speaker's Comer than there are demands for that
time, the multiplicity of views presents no problems. But in many real world
situations, of course, scarcity of resources is a constant, and must be squarely
faced. The University of Wisconsin has only so many dollars to distribute to
student groups, and it is probable, if not inevitable, that demand will exceed
supply nearly every year.
Thus, the nonduplication requirement seems eminently reasonable, yet
at the same time, it is likely to have a noticeable effect on the shape of
student debate. This effect, however, is unlikely to take the form of shutting
out systematically the voices on one or another side of the left-right,
libertarian-authoritarian, liberal-conservative divide. Rather, it may well
have the effect of disfavoring moderate positions. To understand why, we
can look at some of the criticisms of modem objective journalism from
within its own ranks.
Although claims of liberal or conservative bias in the news media have
gained wide attention, 55 a more subtle criticism of modem journalism has
also emerged. This critique points to the unintended consequences not of
bias, but of the attempt to adhere to the accepted standards of twentiethcentury objective journalism. 56 This self-imposed professional standard
resembles, in its essential core, the viewpoint neutral standard placed on
government by First Amendment caselaw. Some have noted that the demand
that "both sides" be heard, when combined with scarcity of airtime or news
hole, leads to the crowding out of voices in the middle. 57 The typical story
on a legislative or judicial struggle over abortion, for example, is likely to
feature voices from the strong "pro-life" and "pro-choice" sides, but not
those seeking a middle ground, despite evidence that 58most Americans
occupy that ambivalent, moderate position on the question.
The viewpoint neutrality requirement in constitutional law may well, in

55. Compare ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA? THE TRUTH ABOUT BIAS
AND THE NEWS (2003) (media has conservative bias) with BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A
CBS INSIDER EXPOSES How THE MEDIA DISTORTS THE NEWS (2001) (media has liberal

bias).
56. SMITH, supra note 54, at 35-54.
57. Id. at40-41.
58. Id. at 41. Smith quotes newspaper editor Cole Campbell, "Journalists keep trying
to find people who are at I and at 9 on a scale of I to 10, rather than people at 3 to 7 where
most people really are." Id.

2003]

The FirstAmendment in the Seventh Circuit: 2002

contexts where scarce resources are allocated, lead to the same crowding out
of voices in the middle, voices speaking in shades of gray, in favor of the
black-and-white debate that follows when practical considerations require
that "all sides" of an issue must be reduced to "both sides." It is hard to see
how a funding system could function without something like a
nonduplication requirement, yet it clearly does pose at least subtle dangers to
the ideal of insuring that all viewpoints gain access to the forum.
The second problem with viewpoint neutrality also finds an analogue in
the debate within journalism over the meaning of objectivity. Both the
viewpoint neutrality requirement of First Amendment law and the standard
application of the principle of objective journalism, implicitly accept that
every issue does, in fact, have (at least) two legitimate sides worthy of
respect and access. 59 But journalists have pondered whether that actually is
true; certainly in some instances even the most "objective" of journalists
would dissent. Newspaper articles about the Holocaust rarely, if ever, feel
obliged to grant equal access to Holocaust deniers. 60 On a less obvious
point, where an overwhelming majority of scientists have concluded that
global warming is a real and troubling phenomenon, is it necessary, or even
61
good journalism, to give equal time or space to the small minority position?
For the most part, government bodies can avoid the issue by
maintaining content-neutral policies, but is this true where the government
body is a University? Unlike, say, the Parks Department or the Port
Authority, 62 the University's central purpose is the pursuit of knowledge,
which presumably also encompasses making judgments about truth claims,
and explicity labeling some positions as false. Because the Holocaust denier
must have access to a public street for expression, must the University give
equal treatment to a student society dedicated to promulgating those views?
Must the University recognize the Flat Earth Society?
Standard First Amendment doctrine, applied without regard to the
special context of the University, would suggest that in each case, the answer
is yes. But here, not only the reality of scarce resources, but also the core
mission of the University, should lead us to hesitate. This should explain
why the University's requirement that student organizations contribute to the
educational mission of the institution, despite the potential that it carries for
illegitimate application to silence unpopular views, also seems to be
reasonable, perhaps necessary.
59. Id. "Getting the other side became the definition of truth telling" injournalism by
the 1970s. Id.
60. Christine Amanpour of CNN, commenting on the proper journalistic approach to

the war in Bosnia during the mid-I 990s, is quoted as saying, "Once you treat all sides the
same in a case such as Bosnia, you are drawing a moral equivalence between victim and
aggressor." Id. At 53. To do so would make the press "an accessory to ... genocide." Id.
61. Smith points to the 1950s and 1960s, when "applying the understanding of
objectivity that was popular at this time," the press gave equal time to scientific evidence
on the connection between smoking and health, and tobacco companies' routine denials.
SMITH, supra note 54, at 52.
62. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
(finding airports are nonpublic forums, but upholding a ban on leafleting as unreasonable).
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As noted, the Seventh Circuit in Southworth emphasized the First
Amendment principle that minority viewpoints must be given equal access,
and treated with respect equal to as majority views. 63 This leads the Court to
the conclusion that grants cannot be based on the size of the membership
organization and its audience. 64 While such a standard would, in the Court's
view, discriminate in favor of popular viewpoints, 65 it is interesting to note
that the application of such a standard would not require any evaluation of
the content of the message promoted at all. If this constitutes viewpoint
discrimination, it is not in the obvious sense of bias against a particular
belief, but rather a systematic tilt in favor of what is currently popular.
Another analogy to journalistic practices helps to clarify why this is not
so obviously improper. Journalists who adhere to currently accepted
standards of objectivity may be faced with an interesting dilemma when
choosing which letters to the editor to print on a particular issue. Where the
letters received greatly exceed the capacity to print them (that is, where
resources are scarce) and the ratio of letters favoring one side of an issue
over the other is, say, 2-1, which choice reflects journalistic objectivity: to
print an equal number of letters on each side, or to print letters on each side
66
in rough proportion to the way in which they reflect the number received?
Neither choice is self-evidently the objective one, that is, a choice that
does not risk at least the appearance of bias. If the editor chooses to run
letters in a proportion reflecting the popularity of each competing view in the
overall count of letters received, he can be charged with bias against
minority views. This bias will not necessarily reflect the editor's own
position, but rather will be a systematic bias in favor of the popular. If, on
the other hand, the editor chooses to give equal space to letters on each side,
she can legitimately be charged with bias against the popular view, in that it
is not receiving its fair share of space; the paper is subtly telling its readers
that the dissenters have more support than they do, thereby increasing the
legitimacy of their views in the perception of readers.67
Of course, the newspaper editor is not bound by the First Amendment,
however much the professional standards of objective journalism may or
may not resemble the restrictions that the Amendment places on
63. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
65. Id. In Arkansas Educational Television v. Forbes, the Supreme Court found that a
government-owned public television station did not engage in unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination when it limited participation in pre-election debates to candidates
demonstrating a minimum level of support. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). This would seem to
suggest, contrary to Southworth, that when resources are scarce, a decision to exclude
viewpoints based on their minimal following may not in all contexts be improper.
66. THE COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW reports a recent survey of newspapers that
received letters to the editor prior to the recent Iraq war that ran about 2-1 against
American involvement. The papers differed on the question of what ratio of pro and antiwar letters should be published. Some published letters in approximately the ratio
received, others felt that objectivity called for an equal number of letters on both sides of
the issue. War and the Letters Page: Who's Counting?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
May/June 2003, at 10.
67. Id.
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governmental decision makers. Still, the analogy is instructive. When
distributing scarce resources that will enable a speaker to more effectively
convey a viewpoint, it is not necessarily suspect to apportion those resources
with some account taken of the level of support that viewpoint has in the
community. 68 Southworth, however, seems to strongly suggest otherwise.
Equal access to scarce government resources for those seeking to speak
means substantial equality for each viewpoint, rather than resource allocation
pursuant to the level of support that each viewpoint can demonstrate.
Perhaps the best defense of a strong skepticism towards government
decisions to regulate access to First Amendment forums based on the level of
popularity of the viewpoint expressed is the strong suspicion that such a
standard will, more often than not, lead to government support for views that
the government itself favors. A popularly elected government, after all, is
likely to usually be on the side of the majority viewpoint on public questions.
The danger, then, may not be that government will systematically favor
majority views, but rather that in doing so, it will systematically favor views
that do not threaten the power of current officeholders.
When government seeks to further its own views by regulating private
speech in a viewpoint discriminatory way, it raises serious constitutional
issues. But what limits, if any, exist on government's power to vigorously
advocate its own views? This question was in the background in a Seventh
Circuit opinion that did not explicitly consider any First Amendment issues
at all. A Woman's Choice v. Newman focused instead on the level of
permissible government restriction on the right to abortion, but in doing so,
considered the government's right to advocate 69
and persuade, and to also
enlist private citizens in delivering that advocacy.
Newman involved a challenge to the 1995 Indiana statute that imposed
an informed consent requirement on women seeking an abortion.7° Under
the statute, a physician performing an abortion, a referring physician, or a
health care professional designated by one of those physicians must provide
information to the pregnant woman, much of which is clearly designed to
persuade the woman to forego the abortion. 71 The challenge in Newman was
68. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television, 523 U.S. at 666.

69. A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir.
2002).
70. Newman, 305 F.3d at 684; IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1 (Michie 1995).
71. The statute requires that, at least 18 hours before an abortion, "in the presence of
the pregnant woman," the physician who is to perform the abortion, the referring
physician, or a health care professional delegated the responsibility by one of these
physicians "orally inform[] the pregnant woman" of the following:
(A) The name of the physician performing the abortion.
(B) The nature of the proposed procedure or treatment.
(C) The risks of and alternatives to the procedure or treatment.
(D) The probable gestational age of the fetus, including an offer to provide:
(i) A picture or drawing of a fetus;
(ii) The dimensions of a fetus; and
(iii) Relevant information on the potential survival of an unborn fetus; at this
stage of development.
(E) The medical risks associated with carrying the fetus to term.
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not to the substance of the information required, but rather to the requirement
72
that it be provided in person at least eighteen hours prior to the procedure.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Supreme Court set forth the current standards for evaluating the
constitutionality of statutory restrictions on the abortion right.73 Under the
Casey framework, a state may regulate abortion in a manner intended to
discourage exercise of the right unless the restriction constitutes an "undue
burden." 74 That term is defined as one that places "a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 75 Plaintiffs in
Newman contended that the Indiana requirement of in person receipt of the
information, by creating the requirement of two visits to a physician, created
76
such an obstacle.
Plaintiffs argued that the requirement of two trips could, by raising the
financial and emotional cost of the abortion, deter a significant number of
women from going through with the procedure, despite their continued
desire for it. 7 7 They relied on studies conducted in Mississippi and Utah on
the effect of similar statutory requirements, that indicated that the number of
abortions declined by ten to thirteen percent due to the statute, 78 as well as
data indicating that in Indiana, abortions did not decline when abortion
information was provided over the phone, or on paper. 79 This led the district
court to conclude that the two-visit requirement would lead to a similar
decline in the incidence of abortion in Indiana, and that this sufficiently
80
demonstrated that the statute imposed an undue burden.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court.8
First, the court
pointed out that Casey itself upheld a waiting period that would require two
visits to a physician, demonstrating that such requirements were clearly not
always impermissible.8 2 Next, the Court held that the Utah and Mississippi
(2) At least eighteen (18) hours before the abortion, the pregnant woman will be
orally informed of the following:
(A) That medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care,
childbirth and neonatal care from the county office of family and children.
(B) That the father of the unborn fetus is legally required to assist in the support
of the child. In the case of rape, the information required under this clause may
be omitted.
(C) That adoption alternatives are available and that adoptive parents may
legally pay the costs of prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care.
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Newman, 305 F.3d at 685.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-76.
Id. at 877.
Newman, 305 F.3d at 685.

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 132 F. Supp.2d 1150,

1175 (S.D. Ind. 2001).

81. Newman, 305 F.3d at 693.
82. "For seven years Indiana has been prevented from enforcing a statute materially
identical to a law held valid by the Supreme Court in Casey... Id. at 693.
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findings could not be used to demonstrate that a similar result would occur in
Indiana, given the significant differences in culture, economics, and
availability of abortion providers.8 3 Finally, even if it could be established
that the Utah and Mississippi studies could accurately predict a decline in the
incidence of abortion in Indiana, these studies cannot establish whether the
decline reflects the illegitimate imposition of84a substantial obstacle, or the
legitimate persuasive effect of the information.
Newman was decided without any reference to the First Amendment.
The Indiana statute was upheld on the grounds that the requirement of two
visits to a physician did not constitute an undue burden on the abortion
right. 85 But beneath the surface, the case tells us something about the
government's power to speak, and to compel speech. While most First
Amendment jurisprudence involves a challenge to government attempts to
punish or otherwise limit private speech, the problem of government
compelled speech has also received judicial attention.86
The judges deciding Newman, including dissenting Judge Wood, agree
that government may legitimately seek to persuade women to forego the
right to an abortion. 87 Even where a constitutional right is involved, then,
government need not refrain from taking a position on whether it should be
exercised, and stating it with some force.
At first glance, the power of government to persuade on choices of
lifestyle that are not illegal, and may even be constitutionally protected, may
seem troubling. Some have contended that the constitutional principle of
equality compels government to maintain a position of neutrality on
questions such as these, and to show equal respect for those who have chosen
different alternatives. 88 But to take this to the point of regarding government
attempts to persuade as illegitimate goes too far. To be sure, there are some
questions on which government cannot take a position. The Establishment
Clause8 9 places religion outside of the range of legitimate government
concern. And government, as distinguished from the individuals who
comprise it, may not openly seek to persuade voters to retain currently

83.
84.
85.
86.
(1986)

Id.at 689-90.
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 693.
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1
(holding a private utility company cannot be compelled to include public interest
material in its billing envelopes); Miami Herald Publ'n Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (holding a newspaper cannot be compelled to provide space for political candidates
to reply to attacks); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding

students cannot be compelled to recite flag salute).
87. Newman, 305 F.3d at 705 (Wood, J., dissenting).

"[A]n increased cost is

unconstitutional if it has the purpose or effect of forcing some women to give up their
constitutional right to choose abortion; it is constitutional if it genuinely furthers the state's
legitimate interest in persuadingwomen not to select abortion ..... Id.
88. This position is prominent in the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1977).

89. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion...").
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dominant political parties or individuals in office. 90 The basic premise of a
liberal democratic government is that it is open to change; for government to
propagandize in favor of its own retention of power would contradict that
basic commitment.
On a wide range of issues concerning how individuals should live,
however, there is no serious objection to government expressing its own
views. No one is required to devote a year or more of his or her life to public
service, yet government may surely promote volunteerism through such
organizations as the Peace Corp or AmeriCorp. Obesity is not illegal, yet
government may surely promote healthy eating habits. Government may
urge teenagers to stay in school beyond the mandatory education age. These,
and a host of other examples, demonstrate that government persuasion is
usually entirely acceptable in pursuance of legitimate social ends.
Potential problems arise, however, at the point that persuasion becomes
coercion. And coercion may take two different forms. The most obvious is
where government directly coerces the individual in a way that interferes
with a substantive right, such as the abortion right. The second form of
coercion, with which we are concerned here, is where government coerces
private individuals to themselves deliver the persuasive messages favored by
government.
Of course, government compelled speech is not always constitutionally
suspect. This is most clearly so in commercial contexts. FDA labeling
requirements, 9 1 product safety warnings, 92 and cigarette health labeling
requirements 93 are obvious examples. And in the medical field, statutory and
common law requirements of informed consent are legitimate restrictions on
physicians' right not to speak.
However, the Indiana statute at issue in Newman, with its requirement
of an oral, face-to-face presentation of a specific range of information by a
private health care professional, should raise some concerns. First, unlike
many of the unexceptional labeling requirements just mentioned, the
required information in Newman is obviously aimed at discouraging the
women from having the abortion.94 Unlike the typical medical informed
consent situation, some of the information is unrelated to the potential of
harm to the patient.
In this regard, the required information might be seen as analogous to
the health warnings required by law on cigarette packages, which are also
clearly intended to discourage smoking. There is, however, one significant
90. Although the Court, in Davis v. Bandemer, found no constitutional violation in the
partisan gerrymandering of the Indiana legislature, it noted that an equal protection
violation could be established by a system that persistently evidenced "both intentional
discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on
that group." 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986).
91. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000), and the
regulations of the Food and Drug Administration issued under its authority.
92. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2000), and the rules issued by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission under its authority.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000).
94. See supranotes 69-85 and accompanying text.
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difference. The cigarette warnings are labeled as government warnings; no
one would regard the anti-smoking message as coming from the
manufacturer of the product itself. The mandatory oral, face-to-face nature
of the Indiana warnings, in contrast, may distort the source of the message,
thereby adding weight to it.
Written materials setting forth the information required by the statute,
identifying the source of the information as the State of Indiana, would
clearly convey the message that it is, in fact, the State that urges women to
pursue alternatives to abortion. But when the information is delivered orally
by a woman's physician, the source of the message is unclear. Is it the state,
pursuing the general welfare, that discourages abortion, or is it the
physician? Any patient will, with justification, expect that the primary, if not
the sole concern of the health care professional is the patient's welfare, and
that the opinions expressed by the professional are his or her own best
estimates of how to further that welfare, rather than the pursuit of Stateendorsed social goals.
A rough, though not perfect, analogy can be drawn between this
context and the lawyer-client relationship. Obviously, the government itself,
acting through its own agents, can seek to persuade a criminal defendant to
plead guilty. But just as obviously, it would be clearly improper for
government to mandate that private defense attorneys always present these
clients with information intended to place a guilty plea in the best possible
light. The defendant legitimately expects that his attorney will act in her
client's best interests, and the defendant will take persuasive information
delivered by his attorney more seriously than the same persuasion coming
from outside of the attorney-client relationship. The perceived source of the
information matters; here, to paraphrase McLuhan, the medium is at least
part of the message.
The Seventh Circuit, in Newman, did not address this question. 95 It is
quite likely that if the Court had, it would have dismissed any First
Amendment claim based upon compelled speech, pointing to the clearly
justifiable requirements of informed consent placed upon all health care
practitioners. In addition, the Supreme Court, in the 1991 case of Rust v.
Sullivan,96 upheld a federal statutory requirement that federally funded
family planning clinics could not counsel their clients on the possible use of
abortion as a method of family planning. 97 Although Rust dealt with a
restriction on speech, rather than compelled speech, and dealt only with
conditions placed on recipients of government funding, rather than
requirements placed on all health care professionals, it suggests the Court's
willingness to permit government to deliver its message of disapproval of
abortion through restrictions placed on health care professionals.
But the contrast between the two cases discussed in this section is
striking. In Southworth, the Seventh Circuit was careful to assure that when
95. See supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
96. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
97. Id. at 203. The statute and regulations issued under it are summarized. Id. at 178-
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government supports private speech, it does so in a way that does not
disadvantage viewpoints that government finds offensive. In Newman,
without addressing First Amendment concerns, the Seventh Circuit upheld a
state requirement that enlists private health care professionals in the
presentation of information conveying the State's obvious disapproval of
abortion.
II. ACCESS To TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORUMS

In Weinberg v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit addressed the First
Amendment implications of Chicago's attempt to limit peddling in the
vicinity of the United Center, the home of the Chicago Bulls and Chicago
Blackhawks.9 s Mark Weinberg is a longtime fierce critic of Bill Wirtz,
owner of the Blackhawks of the National Hockey League. 99 For several
years, Weinberg published and sold a magazine to Blackhawk fans on public
streets outside the United Center.'00 The magazine took a negative view of
Wirtz's ownership activity.' 0'
City authorities did not interfere with
Weinberg's magazine sales.' 0 2 But in 2000, Weinberg wrote and selfpublished a book whose title, CareerMisconduct: The Story of Bill Wirtz's
Greed, Corruption and the Betrayal of Blackhawk Fans, accurately
summarizes its contents, "a highly critical look" at the Blackhawk's
owner. 0 3 When Weinberg began selling his book on streets outside the
United Center during the 2000-2001 Blackhawk's season, he was informed
by police that selling his book would place him in violation of Chicago's
peddling ordinance.1°4 Two provisions of the ordinance were relevant to
Weinberg's activity. The first provided that only "a licensed peddler" was
permitted to sell "any article or service whatsoever, except newspapers, on
any public way."' 1 5 The second, more specific provision, stated that no one
could peddle merchandise on "any portion of the public way within 1000 feet

98. Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2000).

99. Id. at 1033.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 1034. The ordinance, Section 4-244-147 of the Chicago Municipal Code,
provided:

No person shall peddle merchandise of any type on any portion of the public way
within 1,000 feet of the United Center. A person holding a valid peddlers license
may peddle merchandise while on private property within 1,000 feet of the United
Center only from a cart, table or temporary stand on private property without
obstructing the public way, and pursuant to prior written permission from the

property owner to do so.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-244-147 (2001).
Section 10-8-520 of the Municipal Code provided:
No person, other than a licensed peddler.., shall sell, offer or expose for sale, or
solicit any person to purchase any article or service whatsoever, except newspapers,

on any public way.
Id. § 10-8-520 (2001).
105. Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1034.
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of the United Center,"' 10 6 but that a properly licensed peddler could sell
merchandise while on private property within that same radius if the peddler
obtained permission of the property owner, sold only from a fixed stand, and
did not obstruct the public way. 10 7 The stated purpose of the ordinance
was
10 8
"to alleviate traffic congestion and maintain pedestrian safety."'
When threatened with arrest, Weinberg stopped selling his book
outside the United Center, and then brought suit seeking to have the
ordinance declared unconstitutional as applied to the sale of books, on the
grounds that it violated his First Amendment rights.'0 9 Weinberg and the
City agreed to have the case heard by a magistrate judge, who granted
summary judgment for the City. 10 The Seventh Circuit reversed, in an
opinion discussing the limits placed on government in its attempt to regulate
time, place and manner restrictions on speech in traditional public forums, as
well as the limits placed on government when it insists that prior licensing is
a condition for expression."'
When regulating expressive activity in a traditional public forum such
as a public street, government is held to standards more stringent than those
that govern regulation of a limited, or designated, public forum, such as the
student government activity fund discussed above in Southworth.
Government may not close off a traditional public forum from all expressive
activity,12 and in regulating, it must be not only viewpoint neutral," 3 but14
also content neutral, that is, indifferent to the subject matter of the speech.'
In addition, the content neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of
expression must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and leave open ample alternative channels for the speaker to convey
15
the message.'
The City was able to demonstrate that its ordinance was content
neutral. The only arguable content-based distinction made in the ordinance

106. Id
107. Id.
108. Id. Similar restrictions were enacted applying to areas "around other large
stadiums throughout Chicago." Id.
109. Id.

l10. Id.
1ll. Weinberg, 310F.3dat 1046.
112. See supra note 18. See also Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163 (stating, "the streets are
natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not
to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place").
113. See supranotes 19-21 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 16. Contrast the Supreme Court's decision upholding an ordinance
that banned all focused picketing outside of a residence in Frisbyv. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988), with its decision striking down on Illinois statute that prohibited picketing of a
residence unless the residence was also a place of business involved in a labor dispute, in
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). The latter case found that the exemption for labor
disputes "accords preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular
subject," in violation of the principle of content-neutrality. Carey, 447 U.S. at 461.
115. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648

(1981).
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was the exception of newspapers from the items that could not be sold
without a permit.' 16 Weinberg argued that this was content-sensitive,
permitting "topical" expression while restricting "non-topical" matters. 17
But the Court rejected this argument, finding that neither the ordinance nor
the exception for newspapers had anything to do with the content of
expression. Differential treatment of forms of expression violates the
principle of content neutrality only where
"it is directed at, or presents the
' 18
danger of suppressing, particular ideas." "
Weinberg was more successful in his contention that the ordinance
failed to meet the requirements for a valid time, place or manner restriction,
beyond the core requirement of content neutrality. 19 The Court easily found
that the City's interest in public safety and the related interest in maintaining
a steady flow of pedestrian traffic qualified as legitimate.' 20 However, the
Court refused to accept mere "speculation as to what might happen if
booksellers could sell their books and the cumulative effect this might have
on pedestrian traffic" as sufficient to establish that the ordinance actually
advanced the public interest. 121
Where First Amendment concerns are present, the court insisted on
"objective evidence" of disruption of the traffic flow, and here "[t]he City
offered no empirical studies, no police records, no reported injuries, nor
evidence of any lawsuits filed."'' 2 2 And although the exception for
newspaper sales was found not to violate the principle of content neutrality,
it, along with the fact that "activities such as leafleting... street
performances, and charitable solicitations" were not prohibited, led the court
to conclude that the
ordinance insufficiently advanced the City's interest in
23
pedestrian safety.'
Further, the Court held that the 1000-foot ban, which included not only
sidewalks immediately adjacent to the United Center, but also "less
congested walkways" and most of the United Center parking lots, to be
insufficiently tailored to address the legitimate interest of the City. 2 4 The
test here is not the "least restrictive means" test commonly used in strict
scrutiny analysis; but "while a regulation does not have to be a perfect fit for
the government's needs, it cannot substantially burden more speech than

116. See supra note 104.
117. Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1037.
118. Id.at 1036. The Seventh Circuit concluded that "[t]he City's restriction on selling
goods, with the exception of newspapers, is based on its concerns about the disruption and
the effects on traffic congestion, not on suppressing ideas captured in book form." Id.
119. Id.at 1038.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1039. "The City of Chicago has provided no objective evidence that traffic
flow on the sidewalk or street is disrupted when Mr. Weinberg sells his book. The City
offered no empirical studies, no police records, no reported injuries, nor evidence of any

lawsuits filed." Id.
122. Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1039.
123. Id
124. Id at 1040.
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necessary."' 125 The court found that there were obvious "middle ground"
approaches, "such as a ban of less distance, a ban on peddling on certain
peddling on the sidewalks immediately
narrow walkways, or a ban on
126
Center."'
United
the
surrounding
The final requirement of a valid time, place or manner restriction is that
27
it leave open "ample alternative channels" for the regulated expression.1
The City noted that Weinberg could sell his book through bookstores, over
the Internet, or in other parts of the City,' 28 and noted that an alternative can
be considered adequate even if it is not "the speaker's first choice."' 129 But
the court pointed out that the consideration of whether the proferred
must be undertaken in light of the target
alternative means are sufficient
30
audience of the speaker.
Weinberg's primary intended audience was, of course, Blackhawk
fans.13 ' Clearly the best, perhaps the only, way to effectively reach this
audience is to be allowed to deliver one's message to the concentration of
fans going to and from home games. An alternative, held the Court, "is not
adequate if it forecloses a speaker's ability to reach [the intended] audience
even if it allows the speaker to reach other groups."' 32 Here, in view of
"Weinberg's customer base and his unique marketplace," any proposed
alternative would require "Herculean efforts by Weinberg or his customers to
complete the sale.' 33
In addition to challenging the 1000-foot ban on peddling around the
United Center, Weinberg also challenged the licensing procedures under the
Chicago peddling ordinance, on grounds similar to those invoked by the
challengers in Southworth. 134 Weinberg's claim was that the City had
unfettered discretion in the denial of permits, and that in the context of a
this would constitute an impermissible prior
decision to license 1expression,
35
restraint on speech.
Prior restraints, often regarded as the most offensive of possible First
Amendment violations, can appear in two forms: court-imposed injunctions
or administrative decisions to deny permits or licenses.' 36 Despite the
obvious potential threats to free expression that these government acts pose,
neither form of restraint is invariably unconstitutional. 37 Apart from court
125. 1d.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1040-41. See also Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648.
128. Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1041.

129. Id. The court cites Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647, and the recent Seventh Circuit case of
Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000). Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1041.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
United
137.
697.

Id.
Id.at 1042.

Id.at 1041.
at 1042.
Id.
Id.at 1043. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
Weinberg, 310 F.3dat 1043.
See, e.g., Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'n, 486 U.S. 750 (1988); N.Y. Times v.
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
See Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 750; NY. Times, 403 U.S. at 713; Near, 283 U.S. at
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orders restricting attorneys or other officers of the court from commenting
publicly on cases in a way that might threaten the ability to conduct a fair
trial,138 the standard for permitting an injunction barring speech is extremely
high. 39 In contrast, permit and licensing systems do not initially carry with
them such a heavy suspicion of illegitimacy. Systems of licensing can be
used in ways that do not seriously threaten to stifle expression; permit
systems may actually serve to facilitate speakers' ability to deliver their
message.
At the same time, however, allowing government to license expression
creates the obvious threat that such permission will be granted or denied
improperly. Unsurprisingly, the basic requirement for a valid permit system
is that it be content-neutral. But a licensing scheme may be challenged on its
face even where it does not expressly permit consideration of the content of
the speaker's message. It is sufficient for a challenge to demonstrate that the
system gives government "substantial power to discriminate based on the
content or viewpoint of speech,"' 140 and this power can be found in the
absence of sufficient limits on discretion just as easily as in the authorization
of the power to consider content. 141
The Seventh Circuit had little trouble finding that the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional.
The peddling ordinance contained
"absolutely nothing to guide city officials in determining whether to grant a
permit.' 42 The court contrasted this ordinance with the licensing system
approved in Graff v. City of Chicago. 43 There, the Commissioner of
Transportation was given "six set criteria" by which to judge applications for
a permit to build a newsstand. 44 These criteria, the Court held, were

138. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state
bar disciplinary rule prohibiting out-of-court speech by attorneys that created a
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to a pending case, although it did strike
down a provision of the Nevada disciplinary code as impermissibly vague. 501 U.S. 1030,
1074-76 (1991).
Although this case dealt with subsequent punishment, rather than prior restraint, it
does clearly suggest that attorneys, in their role as officers of the court, are subject to
greater regulation of their speech activities in the interest of protecting the integrity of
judicial proceedings.
139. See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 713; Near, 283 U.S. at 697. However, even a strong
presumption against prior restraints may be overcome in an exceptional case. See Neb.
Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (upholding a gag order placed on the press to
assure a fair trial for a criminal defendant).
140. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759.
141. "[A] law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior
restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority, is unconstitutional," Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 150-51 (1969).
142. Weinberg, 310F.3dat 1044.
143. Id.; Graffv. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993).
144. Graff 9 F.3d at 1317-18. The criteria are:
(1) Whether the design, materials and color scheme of the newspaper stand comport
with and enhance the quality and character of the streetscape, including nearby
development and existing land uses;
(2) Whether the newspaper stand complies with this code;
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sufficient to assure that the Commissioner would not approve or disapprove
45
applications based on the content of the material to be sold.1146
The peddling
assurance.
such
no
provided
Weinberg
in
issue
ordinance at
Of course, one might find the entire discussion of the ordinance in First
Amendment terms to be inappropriate. It regulates the sale or solicitation of
sales of articles or services; it is not concerned on its face with expression,
but with activity. The Supreme Court has given limited protection to
"commercial speech," that is, speech that proposes or solicits a commercial
transaction. 47 But here, the Seventh Circuit did not resort to the commercial
speech framework.
A key component of finding speech to constitute commercial speech is
the primarily economic motivation of the speaker. 148 Weinberg's principal
motivation, the Court found, was the dissemination of his criticism of Bill
Wirtz, not merely making a profit.149 But even if that were not so clear, prior
cases make it clear that the distribution and sale of books, as well as
newspapers and magazines, receives strong First Amendment protection,
since "distribution is an inseparable part of expression."' 5 ° The City's
discretion under the ordinance could be exercised in a content-based way to
limit "expression or ... conduct commonly associated with expression."' 15'
Weinberg, then, makes no new law, but is interesting nonetheless. It
provides a clear and concise example of the application of current First
Amendment doctrine on two issues involving access to a traditional public
forum: the limits on government's power to impose time, place and manner
restrictions, and the circumstances under which a licensing system may be
regarded as an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression.
III.

SPEECH BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

No speech is more clearly at the core of what the First Amendment
means to protect than speech criticizing government. Often no one is in a
(3) Whether the applicant has previously operated a newsstand at this location;
(4) The extent to which services that would be offered by the newspaper stand are

already available in the area;
(5) The number of daily publications proposed to be sold from the newspaper stand;

and
(6) The size of the stand relative to the number of days the stand will be open and
operating
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10 28-160(a) (1993).

145. Graff 9 F.3d at 1317-18.
146.

Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1044.

147. See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia State Bd, the Court defined

commercial speech as speech that "propose[s] a commercial transaction." 425 U.S. at 762.
In Central Hudson, commercial speech was defined as speech that "related solely to the

economic interests of the speaker and its audience." 447 U.S. at 561.
148.
149.
150.
151.

CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 561.

Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1044-45.
Id. at 1045 (quoting Graff, 9 F.3d at 1337 (Cummings, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 1044 (quoting Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759).
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better position to offer informed criticism of government than a disaffected
government employee. Yet any employer, including a government agency,
must have some power to discipline or dismiss an employee whose conduct
is disruptive to the efficient functioning of the agency. These conflicting
principles must be balanced where a government employee alleges that a
negative employment decision was made in retaliation for the employee's
exercise of First Amendment rights. Two Seventh Circuit cases decided in
2002 involving the Milwaukee Police Department illustrate the Court's
approach to such disputes.
Gustafson v. Jones15 2 involved a claim of retaliation by the Chief and
former Chief of Police of Milwaukee against two police officers for their
criticism of a policy change that limited officers' discretion to conduct
53
follow-up investigations of crimes that the officers had begun to work on.'
Gustafson and fellow officer Comejo were assigned to an elite Tactical
Enforcement Unit, "whose job would be to patrol designated 'districts
and
54
respond to service calls relayed through the district dispatchers."'
Before July 13, 1993, TEU officers could "take themselves off patrol
duty to conduct follow-up investigations of crimes they had previously
begun to work on," if they notified the district dispatcher and had the
permission of their unit supervisor.' 55 On the night of July 13, 1993,
Gustafson and Comejo, after receiving permission from their supervisor
sergeant, took themselves off patrol duty to follow-up an investigation of a
gang member thought to have held a family at gunpoint a week earlier, and
to have taken shots at a member of that family since then.' 56 The officers
had just been provided with some addresses where the suspect might be
found. 157
In mid-investigation, however, they were instructed by Jones, then
Deputy Inspector and on duty that night as the officer in charge of the
department, to discontinue the follow-up and resume their normal duties,
patrolling and taking assignments only from the dispatcher. 158 The next day,
Jones issued a new protocol for TEU officers.' 59 They were "not to engage
in follow-up investigations without Jones's express permission."' 160 Jones
justified this order as "necessary to overcome the resistance of TEU officers
to doing regular patrol.''
Gustafson and Cornejo, along with other TEU officers, were confused
and upset about the order, which they felt severely limited their ability to do
necessary follow-up work. 62 The importance of follow-up work was even
152.
153.
154.
155.

Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id.at 899-904.
Id. at 899.
Id.

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 900.
159. Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 900.

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 900-01.
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more on the minds of officers, since "just over a year earlier two patrol
officers were fired after failing to properly follow
up on information
163
suggesting criminal conduct by Jeffrey Dahmer."'
Gustafson and Comejo, after approaching their superior officers and
being told that nothing could be done about the order, went to the president
of the police union, to discuss the issue. 164 The union president then sent a
letter criticizing the new policy to Police Chief Arreola, and sent copies to
the media and to elected officials. 165 Both Milwaukee newspapers 66
and
several members of the City Council called for Jones to repeal his order.'
Four months later, Gustafson and Comejo, despite consistently positive
performance reviews, were involuntarily transferred from the elite TEU
unit. 167 They subsequently applied for reassignment to the TEU, but were
passed over, despite being "ranked at the top of the list" for the
assignment. 68 They then sued Arreola and Jones, who had since become
Police Chief. 69 A jury verdict awarded both compensatory and punitive
70
damages to the officers, and the defendants unsuccessfully appealed.1
In the second case, Delgado v. Jones,17 1 plaintiff was a veteran officer
72
of the Milwaukee Police Department, working in the Vice Control Unit.'
After arresting a suspect on drug charges, Delgado received a letter from the
suspect claiming that he "had information about the buying and selling of
drugs by public school employees and the patronage of a drug house by a
close relative of a public official.' 73 The letter also claimed74 that the public
official was "a close personal friend" of Police Chief Jones.'
After showing the letter to his lieutenant, Delgado was instructed to
interview the letter writer, and submit a memorandum summarizing the
interview to the lieutenant.' 75 The memo "moved up the chain of command"
to a deputy chief, who recommended that the matter be investigated by "an
outside law enforcement agency."' 76 Chief Jones, however, ordered that the
investigation remain within the Milwaukee Police Department "and
instructed Delgado's captain not to discuss the ... memorandum with
' 77
Delgado or anyone else."'

163. Id. at 901. See Balcerzak v. City of Milwaukee, 163 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 1998)
(upholding City's disciplinary action against officers who failed to properly follow-up
information concerning Jeffrey Dahmer).
164. Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 902.
165. Id. at 902-03.
166. Id. at 903.
167. Id. at904.
168. Id.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 903-04.
Id. at 899.
Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 514.

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The lieutenant's sardonic comment to Delgado was, "what district do you want
to be transferred to?" Id.
176. Id
177. Delgado, 282 F.3d at 514-15.
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Shortly thereafter, Delgado was involuntarily transferred out of the
Vice Control Division, ordered to take a drug test, and was informed that his
communication with the letter writer was being investigated by the
Department's Internal Affairs Division.' 78 Delgado brought suit, claiming
that his transfer and other actions by Chief Jones were retaliation for the
exercise of his First Amendment rights. 179 The district court denied Jones's
motion to dismiss, in which Jones had claimed qualified immunity. 180 The
81
denial of that defense was unsuccessfully appealed to the Seventh Circuit.'
A century ago, the Supreme Court gave short shrift to the claim by
government employees that they could criticize the operation of their
agencies without retaliation. 182 Justice Holmes remarked, in one of his
famous aphorisms, that while a police officer had a right to free speech, he
had no right to a job as a police officer. 83 But in recent decades, the Court
has established that government employees do, in fact, sometimes have both
rights.
At the same time, the Court has recognized that the free speech rights
of government employees cannot be precisely coextensive with those of the
general public. In Pickering v. Boardof Education,184 the Court noted that
the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in
any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of
the State, as 85
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs. 1

In a series of cases, 186 the Supreme Court has framed a three-part test
for determining whether an employee's First Amendment rights have been
infringed by a retaliatory adverse employment decision. First, the employee
must establish that the speech in question was on "a matter of public
concern."' 187 Next, the employee must show that the speech was "a
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 515
181. Id.
182. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439-45 (1968).
183. Holmes, as a Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, wrote, "The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman ...The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the
terms which are offered him." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18
(Mass. 1892).
184. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
185. Id. at 568.
186. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
187. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. The Court noted that if "employee expression cannot

fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices,
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motivating factor" in the employment decision.' 8 8 Here, the burden is on the
employer to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision" apart from the speech. 8 9 If the employee
satisfies these requirements, the court must balance the employee's speech
interests against any harm the speech has done to the efficiency of the
9
agency.'0
Although Gustafson was on appeal from a jury verdict, and Delgado on
appeal of a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the cases may be examined
together for insight into the application of the three-part test. This is so
because in Delgado, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the standard for
invocation of qualified immunity includes an analysis of the facts as pleaded,
to determine whether "a reasonable official would ...have concluded that
Detective Delgado had a First Amendment right" in his speech. 19'
In each case, the Seventh Circuit had little difficulty holding that the
officer's speech was on a matter of public concern. The determination of
whether speech should be so classified is made in consideration of "the
content, form, and context" of the speech.' 92
The content of the speech in these cases, the effective operation of the
93
Milwaukee Police Department, undoubtedly qualifies as a public concern.,
However, analysis does not end with an examination of content. Even
speech concerning the operation of public agencies may not ultimately
qualify as addressing a matter of public concern if it is "only motivated by
private concerns."' 94 In each of these cases, Chief Jones argued that the
plaintiff officers were motivated by their own career agendas,95 and that this
negated the contention that the speech was of public concern.
The Court in each case rejected this argument. As a matter of law,
motive will control only if the private agenda is the only reason for the
speech;196 at most in these cases, private and public concerns were

without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the name of the First
Amendment." Id.
188. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. The employee must show that his expression "was a
'substantial factor,' or, to put it in other words, that it was a 'motivating factor' for the
government's action. Id.
189. Id
190. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384.
191. Delgado, 282 F.3d at 515.
192. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
193. Delgado, 282 F.3d at 517 (citing Glass v. Dachel, 2 F.3d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 1993):
"Obviously, speech that focuses on police departments (and ultimately police protection
and public safety) involve matters of public concern.").
194. See Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 908. Where the speech, even speech concerning the
operation of a public agency, is entirely motivated by self-interest, it can lose its status as a

matter of public concern worthy of First Amendment protection. See Connick, 461 U.S. at
148; Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1985).
195. Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 908; Delgado, 282 F.3d at 518.
196. "We emphasize the word 'only' because, while speech that is only motivated by
private concerns may not be protected, '[a] personal aspect contained within the motive of
the speaker does not necessarily remove the speech from the scope of public concern,"'
Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 908 (citing Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 371 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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conjoined. 97 In addition, particularly in Delgado, the Court noted that the
officers acted with the knowledge that, if anything, speaking out would make
8
their professional lives more difficult, rather than advancing their careers.19
With the officers' speech found to address a matter of public concern,
the next step is to determine whether the speech was a motivating factor in
this negative job action, and whether the public benefit was outweighed by
the harm this speech may have caused to the efficient operation of the
Department. In Delgado, an appeal of a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity, the Court held that these were
fact-based inquiries that must await trial.' 99 Gustafson, an appeal from a
final judgment, presented the Court with an opportunity to review a full
factual record.200
The first point of interest here, particularly for government defendants
in cases such as this, is the interesting intersection of the causation and the
balancing inquiries. In Gustafson, the defendants denied that the officers'
speech upset them or caused noticeable harm to the operation of the
Department. 2° These denials were obviously meant to establish that the
speech was not a motivating factor in the job action, a conclusion rejected by
the jury verdict. Yet these very assertions largely undermined the
defendants' argument that harm to the operation of the department not only
was present, but outweighed the officers free speech rights and the public
value of the speech.20 2
In performing the balancing test required here, courts will primarily
focus on the presence or absence of evidence that the speech interfered with
the employee's job performance, or created disharmony or morale problems
within the agency. 20 3 It would seem clear that by developing evidence in
support of these disruptive effects, the government defendant abandons, or at
least undermines, any contention that the expression was not a motivating
factor in the job action. In Gustafson, the defendants attempted to finesse
this problem by claiming that they were concerned with possible future harm
to morale or performance that had not yet become evident,20 4 but that

197.
198.
199.
200.

Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 908; Delgado, 282 F.3d at 518.
Delgado, 282 F.3d at 519.
Id. at 521.
Gustafvon, 290 F.3d at 906.

201. Id. at913.
202. Id. The Gustafson Court wrote:
At trial, Chief Arreola and Deputy Inspector Jones elected not only to deny that
they were motivated to transfer Gustafson and Comejo because of their speech, but
also to deny having any knowledge of the speech (Jones) or any concerns regarding
it (Arreola) at the time they recommended that the officers be transferred. Both
denied that the speech embarrassed them and neither offered any testimony
suggesting that the officers' speech either created, or created the potential for, the
kind of disruption that would have warranted punishing speech that is on a matter
of public concern.... Having created this record, they are stuck with it.

Id.
203. See Pickering,391 U.S. at 572-73.

204. See Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 911 (writing "Mere assertions of a generalized potential
for disruption are ... insufficient.").
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argument was found unpersuasive. The lesson here would seem to be that a
government defendant must decide to vigorously contend either that the
expression was not a motivating factor in the job action, or that the job action
was justified by the negative effect of the expression on the agency. An
attempt to establish both at the same time makes each argument the enemy of
the other.
Also worth noting is the court's discussion, in Gustafson, of the
significance of the "manner and means" of the employee's speech. An
employee who quickly "fires off his news release" about internal problems
"without taking advantage of any kind of internal complaint procedures" 20 5
may have difficulty surviving application of the balancing test.
Significantly, the officers in Gustafson went up the proper internal chain of
command, and went public only when, in good faith, they concluded that
"disclosure was necessary given the nature
of their concerns and their
20 6
supervisor's unwillingness to do anything."
In both of these cases, the defendants maintained that they were entitled
to qualified immunity. Such immunity requires a defendant to establish that
"there was no clearly established law that would have put them on notice"
that their actions, i.e. taking a negative job action based upon the exercise of
an employee's free speech rights, was unconstitutional.20 7 Seventh Circuit
cases dating back to 1979 establish this principle.20 8 If this news had not
reached the upper echelons of the Milwaukee Police Department by the
1990s, one can only hope that all public employers within the Circuit have
by now gotten the message. At the same time, employees should keep in
mind that there are legitimate restrictions on the extent to which they may
criticize their own agencies and avoid retaliation. A whistleblower with a
genuine concern for the public good, rather than merely an ax to grind, and a
willingness to first seek redress through established channels, however,
should be encouraged by the Seventh Circuit's disposition of Gustafson and
Delgado.

IV.

THE RELIGION CLAUSES - FREE EXERCISE

The First Amendment may, in the public mind, be most closely
associated with the protection of freedom of expression. But it cannot be
forgotten that the first freedoms referred to by the Amendment involve
religion. A survey of the Seventh Circuit's recent First Amendment activity,
then, should include at least a brief discussion of the court's treatment of
cases presenting free exercise issues. Two recent cases illustrate the relative
ease with which federal courts can dispose of most claims of free exercise205. Id. at 912. The court found this to be a significant distinction of Gustafson from
Greer. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.; Delgado, 282 F.3d at 520.
208. See McGill v. Bd. of Educ., 602 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1979); Walsh v. Ward, 991
F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1993).
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based exemptions from generally applicable law in the years since the
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith.2 °9
In Tarpley v. Allen County,210 plaintiff Tarpley was a prisoner moved
21
from incarceration in New York to the Allen County, Indiana, jail. 1
Following their normal procedures, jail officials "put all of his personal
property into a storage box, including a 'New International Version' Study
Bible".21 2 Tarpley asked for the return of his Bible, but was refused.213
Instead, "the jail's chaplain gave him access to a substitute Bible," 214 one
that contained the identical text as Tarpley's NIV Bible [New International
Version], but did not include the interpretive commentary contained in his
NIV Edition.215
The jail officials based their refusal on a general policy that, while
distributing reading materials, religious and otherwise, to inmates, prohibited
inmates from having "possessory interests" in reading materials. 21 6 The
policy was created "to curb fights over who owned what and to avoid
compensation claims if the materials were lost or stolen." 217 Tarpley,
however, claimed that the denial of access to his preferred version of the
Bible violated his free exercise rights.2 18
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of Tarpley's
claim. 219 The Court stated that "[p]rison restrictions that infringe on an
inmate's exercise of his religion are permissible if they are reasonably
related to a legitimate penological objective." 220 This standard was not
difficult to satisfy. The court accepted the rationale behind the jail's general
policy regarding reading material and found both that an exception would
compromise that policy and that the offer to loan Tarpley the 22
substitute
Bible
1
was sufficient to accommodate his legitimate religious needs.
From the early 1960s 222 until the Smith decision in 1990, it was
generally thought that a claim to a religious exemption from an otherwise
applicable law called for the application of strict scrutiny. 223 Even during

209. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990) (holding that a religion-

neutral law of general applicability need only satisfy rational basis review to justify
denying an exception to religious believers).
210. Tarpley v. Allen County, 312 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2002).
211. Tarpley, 312 F.3d at 897.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 897.
218. Tarpley, 312 F.3d at 898.
219. Id. at 897.
220. Id. at 898.
221. Id. at 898-99.
222. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); see generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
223. "We must next consider whether some compelling state interest.., justifies the
substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right. It is basic that no showing
merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this
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this time, however, the Supreme Court's approach in cases brought by prison
inmates gave substantial deference to the claim that a religion-based
exemption would unduly harm the state's legitimate penological
objectives.224 In Smith, the Court limited strict scrutiny to the rare case
where the challenged statute was not one of general application, but rather
was targeted at religious practice. 225 Where a statutory obligation is one of
general application, the Court held, its application in a way that impinges on
religious practices raises no unique problems; it need only be defended as
rational.2 26
Although Tarpley is a case involving prisoners, and therefore one
examining the particular justification of "legitimate penological objectives,"
it nevertheless illustrates the difficulty of successfully maintaining a free
exercise claim in the post-Smith world. Under strict scrutiny, it seems at
least questionable whether an exception for religious materials would
seriously threaten a compelling state interest. But low-level scrutiny is quite
different. While, outside of prison, no one needs to fear government
confiscation of their own religious reading material, Tarpley does
demonstrate the limited force of the Free Exercise Clause as currently
applied.
The free exercise claim in Te-Ta-Ma Truth Foundation v. World
Church of the Creator227 received even less consideration than the claim in
Tarpley. Te-Ta-Ma was primarily a trademark dispute between two selfdescribed churches.2 2 8
The Truth Foundation, operating under the
trademarked name "Church of the Creator," is dedicated to a doctrine of
"universal love and respect." 229 In contrast, the World Church of the Creator
is a white supremacist group that "depicts the 'white race' as the 'Creator'
and calls for the elimination of Jews, blacks, and what it labels 'mud
races'. ' ' 230 Pointing to evidence of public confusion between the two
organizations, the Truth Foundation sought an injunction against "the World
Church's use of what is obviously a confusingly similar name., 231 Applying
standard principles of trademark law, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district
court decision in favor of the World Church, and remanded the case with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Truth Foundation. 2
highly sensitive constitutional area, 'only the gravest abuses, engendering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."' Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
224. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 347-48 (1987).
225. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78. The only example of such a statute in Supreme Court
cases is Church of Lukmi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993)
(striking down an ordinance directed at practitioners of the Santeria religion, prohibiting
ritual animal sacrifice).
226. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80.
227. Te-Ta-Ma Truth Found. v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662 (7th Cir.

2002).
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Te-Ta-Ma, 297 F.3d at 664-65.
Id.at 664.
Id.
Id. at 664-65.
Id.at 667.
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In addition to its arguments based in trademark law, the World Church
argued that to use trademark law to deny it the use of "Church of the
Creator," and assign exclusive rights in that name to another group, would
violate the First Amendment.233 Citing Employment Division v. Smith,234 the
court was able to dispose of this argument in a simple paragraph. 5

"Congress need not exempt religions from generally applicable laws," and
the general aim of trademark law is not only legitimate, but "promote[s] the
aims of the First Amendment by enabling
producers of the spoken and
236

written word to differentiate themselves."
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith, free exercise claimants have
turned to state constitutional provisions 237 or state or federal statutes 238 to
secure strict scrutiny review of government failure to honor a request for a
religious exemption from an otherwise generally applicable statutory
obligation. As these recent Seventh Circuit cases indicate, the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment has become a much less effective weapon in
securing such an exemption.

233. Id
234. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
235. Te-Ta-Ma, 297 F.3d at 667.
236. Id.
237. See generally Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious
Exercise:An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence,1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 275 (1993).
238. See, e.g., Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 I11.
Comp. Stat. § 35/15
(1998) (calling for strict scrutiny analysis of state legislation burdening religion).
At the federal level, the Supreme Court rejected, on separation of powers grounds,
an attempt by Congress to reinstate the strict scrutiny approach to free exercise claims.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511-15 (1997). Boerne's essential holding
was that Congress is not empowered, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
broaden the substantive scope of the rights provided under the Amendment. See Boerne,
521 U.S. at 519. After Boerne, Congress enacted legislation, under its Article I commerce
and spending powers, requiring application of Sherbert strict scrutiny to free exercise
claims challenging the application of land use regulations and to claims brought by
persons institutionalized in facilities receiving federal funds. See The Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (Supp. 2003). For a
recent application of the Act, within the Seventh Circuit, see Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.
Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Wis. 2002).

